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Pricing sovereign bond risk in the EMU area:  
An empirical investigation 
*
 
 
António Afonso, $ Michael G. Arghyrou,± and Alexandros Kontonikas+ 
 
Abstract 
We use a panel of ten euro area countries to assess the determinants of long-term sovereign 
bond yield spreads over the period 1999.01-2010.11. We find that government bond yield 
spreads are well-explained by fiscal fundamentals over the crisis period. We also find that the 
menu of risk factors priced by markets has been significantly enriched since March 2009, 
including international risk, liquidity risk and the risk of the crisis’ transmission among EMU 
member states. Finally, we find that transmission risk has increased considerably since spring 
2009 due to rapidly increasing risk of investing in periphery bonds relative to core ones.  
 
JEL: C23, E62, H50. 
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1.  Introduction 
Following the 2008-2009 international financial crisis, fiscal imbalances increased in the 
euro area, reflecting the high fiscal cost of the measures taken to contain the fallout from the 
credit crisis. These developments have been followed by a sovereign debt crisis, which started 
from Greece in autumn 2009 and gradually engulfed the whole of the European Monetary 
Union (EMU), particularly the so-called periphery EMU economies. With their government 
bond yields soaring, and following a series of credit rating downgrades, Greece Ireland and 
Portugal were forced in 2010-11 to resort to financial rescue schemes organised by the 
European Union (EU), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). These, however, failed to put a halt to the crisis. Not only all three countries 
remain, effectively, cut-off from international bond markets, but since the second half of 2011 
Spanish and Italian government bonds have been under significant market pressure.  
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A number of recent studies have attempted to identify the factors affecting EMU 
government bonds yields spreads against Germany, the variable typically used to measure the 
crisis’ severity and extent. These studies share two common findings. First, the widening in 
spreads is largely driven by the increased international risk factor. In this process, the role of 
the banking sector has been crucial (see Attinasi et al., 2009; Barrios et al., 2009; Gerlach et 
al., 2010; Schuknecht et al., 2010; and Acharya et al., 2011). Second, markets now penalise 
fiscal and macro-imbalances much more heavily than before the crisis (see Barrios et al., 
2009; Manganelli and Wolswijk, 2009; Schuknecht et al., 2010; Favero and Missale, 2011; 
Arghyrou and Tsoukalas, 2011; Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012). Moreover, there exist 
important cross-country contagion/spill-over effects (see Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012; De 
Santis, 2012; Favero and Missale, 2011). Finally, liquidity risk has been playing a limited role 
in the current crisis (see e.g. Barrios et al., 2009; Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012; De Santis, 
2012; Favero and Missale, 2011).  
In this paper we investigate the determinants of European government bond yield 
spreads against Germany adding to the existing literature three new dimensions. First, our 
analysis focuses onto the extent to which the determination of spreads has changed before and 
after the onset of the crisis, as well as during different stages of the crisis. Specifically, we 
distinguish not only between the period preceding and following the global credit crunch in 
the summer of 2007, as the majority of existing studies do, but also the period during which 
the global credit crunch had not yet mutated into a sovereign debt crisis; and the period during 
which it did so, following the revelation in spring 2009 of the fiscal costs caused by the global 
credit crunch. Second, we allow government bond yields to be determined by a quantitative 
measure of the risk of crisis transmission across EMU countries derived using principal 
components analysis.  This reveals increasing divergence between core and periphery EMU 
and provides information on the market’s perception regarding each country’s classification 
across the two groups, as well as the firmness of this perception. Finally, we use a widened set 
of fundamentals in the empirical analysis of EMU sovereign spreads allowing us to test 
whether spreads’ variability is explained by factors additional to those considered by the 
existing literature.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses our 
methodology. Section 3 presents our empirical findings. Finally, section 4 concludes.   
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2.  Methodology 
Existing studies typically model European government bond yields on three main 
variables namely an international risk factor; credit risk and liquidity risk (see e.g. Manganelli 
and Wolswijk, 2009). Based on the above, we use a unified framework of analysis capturing 
simultaneously and extending the insights of the studies by Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012) 
and Afonso et al. (2012). In its simplest version our econometric model can be written as: 
sprit = a + β1sprit-1 + β2vixt + β3bait + β4balanceit +  β5debtit + β6qit + β7gindit   
             + β8pc2t + γi + εit.                 (1) 
Equation (1) models the 10-year government bond yield spread versus Germany, sprit, 
on the international risk factor, bond market liquidity conditions, macroeconomic and fiscal 
fundamentals, and contagion effects, also incorporating country-specific fixed effects (γi). We 
employ a panel of ten euro area countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain), using monthly data over the period 1999:01-
2010:12. The data sources and definitions are in the Appendix. To account for endogeneity 
across the right hand side variables1 we estimate equation (1) using Two-Stage Least Squares 
(2SLS) with cross-section weights accounting for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity.2  
Following standard practice in the literature Equation (1) includes lagged spreads to 
account for spreads’ persistence (see also Gerlach et al., 2010).3 vixt is the logarithm of the 
S&P 500 implied stock market volatility index (VIX), a widely-used proxy for the 
international risk factor (see e.g. Beber et al., 2009; and Gerlach et al., 2010). bait denotes the 
10-year government bond bid-ask spread used to capture liquidity effects (see e.g. Barrios et 
al., 2009; Favero et al., 2010; and Gerlach et al., 2010). balanceit and debtit respectively 
denote the expected (one-year ahead) government budget balance-to-GDP ratio and the 
expected government debt-to-GDP ratio, both measured as differentials versus Germany (see 
                                                           
1 For each sample country we have applied the Darbin-Wu-Hausman endogeinity test. The results (available 
upon request) suggest that the null hypothesis of exogeneity for the vector of the right-hand side variables of 
equation (1) is rejected.  
2 An alternative panel estimation approach, the Arrelano and Bond Genarlised Method of Moments, is more 
appropriate when the panel includes a large number of cross-sections and a small number of time-series 
observations, that is the opposite case of the panel we work with. We have also estimated our models using the 
Feasible Generalised Least Squares method with cross-section weights accounting for cross-sectional 
heteroskedasticity. The results (available upon request) are similar to the 2SLS ones.  
3 While the persistent nature of spreads implies that the exclusion of the lagged spread will generate omitted 
variable bias (see Hallerberg and Wolff, 2008) its inclusion generates a different bias since the lagged spread is 
correlated with the fixed effects (see Nickell, 1981). Nevertheless, the latter bias declines as the time-series 
dimension of the panel (T) increases and becomes quite small once T reaches 20 (see Hallerberg and Wolff, 
2008). In our sample T = 144, hence any bias due the inclusion of the lagged spread is very small and in all 
likelihood smaller than the omitted variables bias arising by its exclusion. For robustness we have also estimated 
our base line model excluding the lagged spread term. The results, available upon request, remain very similar.  
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e.g. Gerlach et al., 2010; and Favero and Missale, 2011).4 qit is the log of the trade-weighted 
real effective exchange rate. This captures credit risk originating from general 
macroeconomic disequilibrium although, given the inclusion in equation (1) of variables 
specifically capturing fiscal fundamentals and growth conditions, in our specifications it may 
be mainly capturing external competitiveness.5 gindit is the annual growth rate of industrial 
production (differential versus Germany), used as a proxy for the effects of economic growth 
on spreads (see Bernoth et al., 2004). Finally, pc2t is our proxy for the risk of transmission of 
the sovereign debt crisis among EMU members. This is derived using principal components 
analysis (see Longstaff et al., 2011) explained in section 3.1 below.  
We extend Equation (1) by adding variables capturing further insights relating to the 
movements of spreads within the EMU. First, we add the share of long-term general 
government debt, ltsdebtit, defined as debt maturing at least after one year, in total general 
government debt. Second, we add the interaction between past spreads and illiquidity 
conditions (see Llorente et al., 2002). Given that sovereign bond yield spreads and bid-ask 
spreads are highly positively correlated,6 the product of these two variables typically increases 
(declines) because both terms increase (decline). Therefore, (sprit-1*bait-1) can be interpreted 
as a stress indicator for bond markets, since a rise is associated with falling bond prices and 
higher illiquidity. Assuming an increase in spreads and illiquidity, a positive coefficient for 
(sprit-1*bait-1) would indicate the existence of market forces pushing bond prices below their 
equilibrium value, as this is determined by the remaining spreads’ determinants. This would 
be consistent with (though not definitely proving) speculation trading pushing bond prices 
below their fair value. On the other hand, a negative coefficient for (sprit-1*bait-1) would 
indicate market forces pushing bond prices above their equilibrium value. This could be 
consistent with (a) purchases by private agents, speculating that the market has underpriced 
bonds, which they proceed to buy in anticipation of a future price increases; (b) purchases by 
institutional investors in an effort to prevent a collapse of the bonds’ market. Overall in its 
most general form our empirical model of spreads is given by:  
sprit = a + β1sprit-1 + β2vixt + β3bait + β4balanceit + β5debtit + β6qit + β7gindit 
+ β8pc2t + β9ltsdebtit + β10debtit
2 + β11sprit-1bait-1 + γi + εit .    (2) 
                                                           
4 These forecasts are produced by the European Comission’s DG ECFIN twice a year (spring and autumn).  
5 The inclusion of real exchange rates in a model for spreads is theoretically justified in the analysis of Arghyrou 
and Tsoukalas (2011). The empirical significance of real exchange rates in explaining spreads in the EMU area 
has been confirmed by Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012). 
 
6 In our panel the correlation coefficient between sovereign bond yields spreads and bid-ask spreads is 0.77.  
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After estimating Equations (1) and (2) we account for two possible structural breaks in 
the relationship between spreads and their determinants using two slope dummy variables. 
The first (D2007.08t) aims to capture the effects of the global financial crisis, widely accepted 
to begin in August 2007 (see e.g. Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012; Attinasi et al., 2009). The 
second (D2009.03t) captures the point in time when the global credit crisis started being 
transformed into the European sovereign debt crisis. We date this development back to March 
2009 for two reasons. First, the most intense period of the credit crisis was over by the spring 
2009 with major stock market indices experiencing their lowest levels in early March 2009 
and since then recording significant gains. Second, March 2009 was the month when the 
European Commission revised upwards the projected public debt to GDP ratio by an average 
of 19% across euro area members, making the fiscal fallout of the banking crisis public news.  
 
3.  Empirical findings  
3.1.  Measuring transmission effects  
Following the spike in all countries’ spreads at the height of the global credit crunch, the 
spreads of core EMU countries have been relatively stable, albeit at levels higher compared to 
those of the pre-crisis period, while those of periphery EMU countries have been on an 
ascending path. This core-periphery divergence raises the possibility of transmission of the 
sovereign debt crisis within the euro area. We define transmission as the increase in the 
spread of any given EMU country due to the markets discounting worsened future fiscal 
and/or macro fundamentals for that country after having observed an increased probability of 
default in another EMU country, reflected in higher spreads for that second country. 
Transmission can take place both from periphery to core countries, as well as within 
periphery countries and is linked to periphery-core divergence through two channels. 
First, core-periphery divergence, denoting increased probability of default and/or euro 
exit in one or more periphery countries, signals an increased probability of future sovereign 
rescues. Given the superior state of their fiscal fundamentals, the latter are more likely to be 
financed by core countries. Therefore, core-periphery divergence signals an increased 
probability of increased future borrowing requirements from core countries to cover the 
potential support efforts. Through this channel, core-periphery divergence may cause 
transmission of the crisis from the periphery to the core.  
Second, increased probability of default and/or euro exit in one periphery country may 
operate as a trigger for fears of subsequent default and/or euro exit in another periphery 
country (the so-called domino effect). Hence, increasing core-periphery divergence caused by 
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increased spreads in a specific periphery country may cause precautionary capital flight in 
other periphery countries, leading to a tighter credit environment and deteriorating growth 
expectations. These, in turn, can cause deteriorating expectations about future fiscal 
performance, increasing credit risk through the channels linking banking risk with sovereign 
risk. Through this channel, increasing core-periphery divergence may cause crisis 
transmission from one periphery country to another.   
To test the transmission hypothesis we need a quantitative measure of transmission risk 
which we pursue through a principal components analysis (see Longstaff et al., 2011). The 
results are presented in Table 1. The reported eigenvalues and the cumulative proportion 
figures suggest that the variance of the spreads is essentially captured by the first two 
principal components which explain around 97% of the variation of the full variable set. This 
also implies that we only take into account the components whose associated eigenvalues are 
above 0.7, a rule suggested by Jollife (1972). 
[Table 1] 
 The first principal component can be interpreted as an EMU-wide indicator of sovereign 
risk (roughly a general index of spreads) with all countries entering with approximately equal 
weights. The second component differentiates between two groups of countries, distinguished 
by the sign of the reported weights. Table 1 suggests that the first group (denoted by a 
positive sign) includes Finland, the Netherlands, Austria, France and Belgium. The second 
group (denoted by a negative sign) includes Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Italy. The 
country composition of the two groups identified by the second principal component 
coincides with the core- and periphery-groups widely assumed to exist within the euro area. 
The absolute size of the reported weights is indicative of the markets’ perception regarding 
the definitiveness of a country’s position within its group. These suggest a firm periphery 
classification for Greece, Portugal and, to a slightly lesser extent, Spain and Ireland. Italy falls 
within the periphery group by a small margin. On the other hand, we obtain a firm core 
classification for Finland, Netherlands, and Austria and, to a lesser extent, France. Belgium 
falls within the core group by a small margin. 
The second principal component provides a measure of divergence between the core and 
periphery groups, roughly a kind of spread between the core and periphery countries (see 
Longstaff et al. 2011, p.81) As such, it can be interpreted as the risk involved in investing in 
core bonds relative to the risk of investing in periphery bonds. As explained earlier, increasing 
divergence between the core and periphery groups indicates an increasing probability of a 
sovereign default and/or euro exit within the periphery group. This is directly linked to the 
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concept of crisis’ transmission through the two channels (periphery-to-core and periphery-to-
periphery transmission) described above.  
 Figure 1 plots the first two estimated principal components for the period 1999-2010. 
Focusing on the second principal component, starting from early 2009 the two groups are 
decoupled, with the risk of the periphery relative to the core increasing rapidly. Furthermore, 
the first principal component has been rising since early 2010 indicating the possibility of 
transmission from the developing periphery crisis. Overall, the movements of the second 
principal component provide clear evidence for core-periphery divergence since early 2009, 
which in association with the recent increase in the first principal component, and on the basis 
of our arguments above, renders the former variable an appropriate proxy for transmission 
effects. In our empirical models variable pc2t, defined as minus the second principal 
component, is used to capture transmission effects.7  If the latter are present pc2t is expected 
to enter the empirical models of spread determination with a significantly positive sign.  
 [Figure 1] 
3.2.    Panel estimation results 
We start our econometric investigation by estimating Equations (1) and (2) for the full 
sample period without allowing for possible structural breaks. The results from our 2SLS 
estimations are reported in Table 2. Spreads appear to be highly persistent. In Column (2), 
that reports estimates from the fully specified model, we obtain statistically significant 
coefficients with the theoretically expected signs for the international risk factor, the fiscal 
balance and growth conditions. Liquidity conditions are significant with the appropriate sign 
only in the estimates of Column (1). The role of fiscal fundamentals appears limited, since 
public debt and the ratio of long-term debt to total debt are not statistically significant while 
the fiscal balance is significant only at the 10% level. Finally, real exchange rates, the 
principal component capturing transmission effects and the multiplicative term involving past 
spreads and illiquidity are not significant. Overall, some of the findings reported in Table 2 
are consistent with our a priori expectations while others are not. 
[Table 2] 
We now turn our attention to the examination of structural change in the links between 
the risk factors and sovereign spreads. Specifically, we repeat our estimation of the fully 
specified model accounting for slope dummies differentiating between three periods, namely 
the period preceding the global financial crisis (1999.01 – 2007.07), the early crisis period 
                                                           
7 Increases in pc2t indicate higher periphery risk. The negative sign of the second pricipal component in the 
definition of pc2t is an adjustment for the fact that periphery countries load negatively in the former. 
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(2007.08 – 2009.02) and the latter crisis period (2009.03 – 2010.12). Column (3) in Table 2 
reports the 2SLS estimation results. Our results suggest that markets started pricing the 
international risk factor since the onset of the global credit crunch in summer 2007 and 
liquidity risk only during the latter part of the European debt crisis. Importantly, we find that 
there was stronger impact from international risk on sovereign spreads during the escalation 
of the debt crisis. Furthermore, transmission risk becomes a significant determinant of spreads 
since March 2009, with the variable displaying the theoretically expected positive sign. The 
role of fiscal fundamentals, debt in particular, increases in significance during the crisis 
period: Markets have been penalising increases in expected debt throughout our sample 
period but started attaching increasingly higher penalties since the onset of the financial crisis 
in August 2007 and especially during the debt crisis period. Furthermore, since March 2009 a 
decrease in the long-term component of total public debt is associated with higher spreads.8  
All in all, our results suggest that since the onset of the global financial crisis in summer 
2007 markets have gradually moved to a pricing model that is much more compatible with 
theoretical expectations. 9Furthermore, the menu of fundamentals affecting sovereign risk has 
been becoming richer as the crisis evolves. Therefore, compared to the no-breaks models, 
accounting for structural change offers superior information regarding the determinants of 
sovereign bond spreads in the euro area and the timing of activation of these links, especially 
for the crisis period. 
                                                           
8 The positive sign of the first slope dummy on ltsdebt indicates that between summer 2007 and spring 2009 the 
decrease in the share of long-term debt to total debt was not penalised by markets. This is consistent with the 
prediction by Favero et al. (2010) according to which in crisis periods investors choose from a reduced set of 
alternative investment opportunities, limiting their willingness to move away from government debt securities. 
In the process of fleeing the stock market at the early phase of the global credit crisis, and given an environment 
of high uncertainty not favouring long-term commitment of funds, investors increased their demand for liquid 
short term Treasury bills. At the same time, sovereign bond issuers had an incentive to increase short term debt 
issuance in order to avoid locking themselves into (the prevailing at the time) high long-term borrowing costs. 
9 Our finding that international risk, liquidity risk and the majority of fiscal and macro variables were not priced 
prior to the global credit crunch of 2007 is supportive of the ‘convergence trade’ hypothesis, according to which 
investors “…bought the bonds of peripheral European governments in the hope that their yields would 
convergence with those of Germany” (The Economist, 12/06/2010). The resulting high demand for the bonds of 
periphery countries exerted a downward pressure on their spreads and the expectation of convergence became 
self-fulfilling, leading to profits for bond market investors and lower borrowing costs for the governments, even 
in the presence of deteriorating fundamentals. This hypothesis, and the findings reported in Table 2, are 
consistent with the theoretical model by Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2011), according to which prior to 2007 the 
investment risk caused by macro and fiscal imbalances were not priced by markets due to full credibility of each 
country’s EMU participation and a perceived guarantee of the fiscal liabilities of each EMU member by the rest 
of the EMU countries. Arghyrou and Tsoukalas argue that following the global credit crunch and developments 
in Greece in 2009 a double shift in expectations took place, transferring Greece and other periphery EMU 
countries from a regime of full credibility of future EMU participation under fiscal guarantees, implying no 
pricing of any risk factors, to a regime of non-fully credible EMU participation without fiscal guarantees, where 
markets attach positive risk premia to all sources of investment risk in line with theoretical expectations.  
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4.  Conclusions 
In this paper we studied the determinants of long-term government bond yield spreads 
against Germany in ten euro area countries using an extended set of potential spreads’ 
determinants and monthly data over the period 1999:01-2010:11. In the process we derived a 
quantitative measure of the crisis’ perceived transmission risk using principal components 
analysis. This provides information on the risk of investing in periphery relative to core 
bonds, the composition of each group and the firmness of market perceptions regarding each 
country’s classification within the groups. Our main findings can be summarised as follows: 
First, starting from early 2009 periphery and core countries are clearly decoupled, with the 
perceived risk of the periphery relative to the core increasing rapidly. Second, European 
government bond yield spreads are well-explained by fiscal fundamentals over the crisis 
period. Third, the menu of risk factors priced by markets has been significantly enriched since 
March 2009, including the risk of the crisis’ transmission, international risk and liquidity risk.  
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1: Principal components of 10-year government bond yield spreads 
 
 
 
Table 1: Principal component analysis of bond yield spreads  
 
Note: Principal component analysis is carried out over the time period 1999.01-2011.01 (T=143). 
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1 8.193 0.819 Austria 0.315 0.330 
2 1.477 0.967 Belgium 0.343 0.070 
3 0.121 0.979 Finland 0.278 0.458 
4 0.058 0.985 France 0.336 0.160 
5 0.049 0.990 Greece 0.290 -0.424 
6 0.034 0.993 Ireland 0.323 -0.265 
7 0.022 0.995 Italy  0.340 -0.058 
8 0.019 0.997 Netherlands 0.295 0.422 
9 0.016 0.999 Portugal  0.307 -0.380 
10 0.011 1.000 Spain  0.327 -0.273 
. 
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Table 2: Modelling bond yield spreads 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The regression models are estimated over the time period 1999.02-2010.11 (T=142). The panel 
members include Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and 
Spain (N=10). Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) fixed effects panel estimates, which account for 
endogeneity, are reported. The dummy variables D2007.08 and D2009.03 which are equal to one from 
August 2007 and March 2009 onwards, respectively, and zero otherwise were also included as intercept 
dummies. Colum (1) reports the estimates from the no-breaks baseline model, while Column (2) reports 
the estimates from the no-breaks fully specified model. Column (3) reports the estimates of the fully 
specified model that accounts for structural change. The instruments used in the 2SLS estimation of 
Column 1 are the first lag of vix, pc2 and ba, and the first to third lag of q, balance, debt and gind. In the 
estimates of Column 2 the first lag of ltsdebt is added in the set of instruments, while in Column 3 the 
interactive terms are treated as predetermined, as they are entering in their first lag.. The J-statistic 
considers the null hypothesis of valid over-identifying restrictions. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5, 10% level respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
sprit-1 0.841 *** 0.810 *** 0.476 *** 
vixt 0.062 *** 0.066 *** -0.013 
vixt*D2007.08t   0.175 * 
vixt*D2009.03t   0.446 ** 
pc2t 0.001 -0.001 -0.076 
pc2t *D2007.08t   -0.016 
pc2t *D2009.03t   0.146 *** 
bait 0.004 ** 0.004 -0.001 
bait*D2007.08t   -0.002 
bait *D2009.03t   0.014 *** 
qit 0.053 0.118 0.167 
qit*D2007.08t   0.212 
qit *D2009.03t   3.189 
balanceit -0.007 * -0.009 * -0.011 
balanceit *D2007.08t   0.004 
balanceit *D2009.03t   -0.018 
debtit 0.000 0.001 0.002 ** 
debtit *D2007.08t   0.001 * 
debtit *D2009.03t   0.004 *** 
gindit -0.004 *** -0.003 * 0.001 
gindit *D2007.08t   0.001 
gindit *D2009.03t   -0.005 
ltsdebtit  0.144 0.093 
ltsdebtit *D2007.08t   0.702 *** 
ltsdebtit *D2009.03t   -0.528 * 
sprit-1* bait-1  0.000 0.004 
sprit-1* bait-1*D2007.08t   0.000 
sprit-1* bait-1*D2009.03t   -0.004 
N*T 1420 1420 1420 
Adj-R2 0.96 0.96 0.95 
J-statistic  5.630 6.138 12.679 
. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Data definition and sources 
 
Variable Sample Description      Source 
spr 1999.01-2011.01 10 year government bond yield (differential vs. Germany) ECB/Reuters 
vix 1999.01-2011.01 (Log of) S&P 500 implied stock market volatility index (VIX) Bloomberg 
pc2 1999.01-2011.01 (Minus) Second principal component of spread Own calculations 
ba 1999.01-2011.01 10 year government bond bid-ask spread ECB 
q 1999.01-2010.12 (Log of) CPI based real effective exchange rate  IMF 
balance 1999.01-2011.01 Expected budget balance/GDP (differential vs. Germany)  European Comission 
debt 1999.01-2011.01 Expected debt/GDP (differential vs. Germany) European Comission 
gind 1999.01-2010.11 Industrial production annual growth (differential vs. Germany)   IMF 
ltsdebt 1999.01-2011.01 Long-term/Total general government debt  ECB 
D2007.08 1999.01-2011.01 Dummy variable: 1 from 2007.08 onwards, zero otherwise Own calculations 
D2009.03 1999.01-2011.01 Dummy variable: 1 from 2009.03 onwards, zero otherwise Own calculations 
 
